The committee will come to order, and as usual

at this time of year, every Senator has two other committee meetings

to attend. It is difficult to be two places at once. They will be

coming in later, Mr. Ambassador, and you being the first witness.

And let me inform the young people who are welcome here this

morning that the first witness is the Honorable Richard Butler, the

former Executive Chairman of the United Nations Official Commission

on Iraq, called UNSCOM. He is a diplomat now in residence

on the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City.

And, Mr. Ambassador, we, of course, welcome you and very much

appreciate your going so far out of your way to participate in this

important hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee. As we meet

this morning, the U.N. Security Council is trying to plan a new

weapons inspection regime for Iraq to replace UNSCOM, the commission

that you headed. In order to buy off certain Security Council

members, some may be working to ease the existing sanctions

on Iraq.

Now, I have a few thoughts on the deliberations going on up in

New York City. I have heard some argue that any weapons inspections

in Iraq are better than no inspections. I don’t subscribe to

that myself, for one obvious reason. Meaningful inspections must

be intrusive, thorough, and open-ended, in other words, not different

from the inspections conducted by your organization, sir,

when you headed it.

If anybody concludes, therefore, that I would regard any new inspection

regime accepted by Saddam Hussein as a charade, that

conclusion is perfectly valid, for that is precisely the way I feel

about it. Worse yet, in exchange for whatever inspection regime

Saddam and his allies will agree upon in the United Nations, the

United Nations will ease sanctions on Iraq, and our friends at the

Department of State obviously believe that easing sanctions on

Iraq will undercut the argument that it is sanctions that are starving

the Iraqi people, which it seems to me is bureaucratic nonsense.

It is Saddam Hussein, nobody else, who is starving the peo-

ple of Iraq. Food and medicine are rotting in Iraqi warehouses undistributed

while little children suffer and die.

In northern Iraq, where the United Nations distributes food, the

child mortality rates are below prewar levels, and in the center and

the south where Saddam Hussein is in charge, rates—mortality

rates, that is—are twice, are twice what they were before the war.

Forbes magazine recently rated Saddam Hussein as one of the richest

men in the world, with $6 billion in personal wealth. So lifting

sanctions on Iraq will do nothing more than enable Saddam Hussein

to import the building blocks for weapons of mass destruction,

and I have no doubt about his interest in doing precisely that.

UNSCOM was drummed out of Iraq, and since that happened,

Saddam has been up to his old dirty tricks and while a new inspection

regime might—I think I want to underscore might somehow—

might slow that process a bit here and there, Saddam Hussein is

not going to tolerate a serious weapons inspection and monitoring

effort for very long. So it is back to the drawing board and what

we will do? We will buy him off with nuclear reactors? Not with

the willingness of this Senator.

We need to face up to the fact that we are playing Saddam Hussein’s

game, not ours. He wanted inspectors out and out they went.

He wants sanctions lifted and sanctions are being eased. This game

can be played for a little while while scarcely anybody is paying attention,

but it has to end somewhere. Clearly the majority of the

permanent Security Council members don’t care about the Council’s

credibility. But if the United States does not stand up and be

counted, Saddam will have tweaked the noses of weak-kneed ‘‘diplomats’’

once more.

Sooner or later, and I imagine sooner rather than later, this administration

will have to admit that Saddam Hussein is determined

to acquire weapons of mass destruction at any price, so if

the United States is serious about ensuring stability in that region

by disarming Iraq, Saddam is going to have to be ousted first.

So, Mr. Ambassador, I will have some questions

after your statement. Again, I commend your courageous work. It

may be that we disagree about some matters, but you have my unreserved

admiration and respect for your leadership in that job.

You may proceed, sir.

The reason I turned abruptly, I understood you

to say off the record.

She corrected me. I don’t hear everything here

sometimes. It is on the record, and we will proceed.

Mr. Ambassador, it is a great statement. And I

was thinking as you made it, and I followed you in the printed

transcript, at the time you were trying to get compliance by Iraq,

we got a dribble of reports here in the news media, and a dribble

there, and they were more interested in who was the President’s

latest girlfriend, and I doubt that 1 percent of the American people

understand what has happened. And I do hope that some attention

will be paid through the C–SPAN or whoever it is that is covering

this.

Now, I have some questions, but underlining the portion of your

prepared remarks which you delivered in this case, you say that a

little over a year ago during consultations at Baghdad, you said

that Tariq Aziz demanded that you declare Iraq disarmed. That

was consistent with the prior position that Iraq had stated during

preceding months, including in writing to the Secretary General of

the United Nations and to the Security Council, and ‘‘I refused,’’

you said, to do so on the grounds that ‘‘I was not able to do it,’’

obviously because it was not so, and it would have been detrimental

to anything that anybody considers self-protection of innocent

nations and all the rest of it.

You said further that, ‘‘I refused to do so on the grounds that I

was not able to. We had given Iraq a list of the remaining materials,

the evidence it needed to provide in order for UNSCOM to

complete the disarmament job. Iraq had failed to provide that evidence.

Following my refusal,’’ you said, ‘‘to agree to Aziz’s demand,

Iraq shut down all work by UNSCOM.’’ In other words, they shut

you up and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq.

Now, at the time, how did you feel about the possibility that the

people of any nation, and of course I am particularly interested in

the United States, would understand what was really going on

there? Did you—are you—were you concerned about the failure to

report this to the people of all of the member nations of the United

Nations? Were you concerned about that at the time?

One other, in reference to your prepared remarks

which you delivered in this instance, you said that since that time,

there has been a continuing negotiation in the Security Council

about a draft resolution which would address both the disarmament

and monitoring issues and the sanctions issues. Now, my

question is, who is negotiating with whom? Do you know?

Two quick questions. Well, go ahead.

Did you ever discuss this with Kofi Annan, the

Secretary General?

Did you discuss this entire problem with the Secretary

General?

Was he sympathetic or did he take any position

or what?

Very well. Let us say 6 minutes. And we welcome

you, Senator Kerry.

You are Mr. Kerry?

Go ahead.

Senator Brownback.

OK.

Thank you. Senator Wellstone.

Very good. All right.

Sir, let me, I have two or three questions that

I really want to ask you. You did an article for Talk magazine

which I found very interesting. You referred to Russia as the

strongest, I believe advocate—no, most aggressive advocate of Saddam.

Who else is an aggressive advocate of Saddam, China?

Would it be fair to say that if this were a poker

game, Mr. Saddam Hussein would be holding a royal flush himself?

Russia, China, a do-nothing United Nations and Kofi Annan sitting

it out. Is that approximately correct?

So far.

But he has got a winning hand so far because

he is pushing everybody else around.

Including your own self?

Very well. One final note. You do not have to

comment on this, but I talk to a lot of young people who come to

the office, college students, and they do not even know who I am

talking about when I talk about the Kurds, let alone what Saddam

Hussein did to them. He murdered thousands of his own people.

And he left many others maimed horribly, and yet, that is not

known by the people being educated in our schools today, colleges

today.

I see my time is up. I am going to yield to the distinguished Senator

from Massachusetts.

Go on ahead.

I thank you, Senator.

Mr. Butler, we have in the audience several Iraqi opposition

leaders, including the leaders of one main Kurdish party, and a

representative of the Shiites in Iraq. I do not know whether they

want to stand up or not, but the chair wants to welcome you and

compliment you on coming here. Thank you very much.

And finally, on a personal note, Mr. Ambassador, regarding the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I think it ought to be made a

matter of record in this hearing that this treaty would give Saddam

Hussein the very protections that he pursued but was denied in his

efforts to undermine UNSCOM. I will give you several examples.

Saddam demanded the right to veto the participation of particular

nations, specifically, specifically the United States and the

United Kingdom, on inspection teams. CTBT denies the United

States the right to have inspectors on any inspection conducted at

the U.S. request.

Saddam repeatedly sought to dictate which UNSCOM inspectors

could and could not participate in inspections. Several UNSCOM

officials such as David Kane, Scott Ritter, were the subjects of Iraqi

attacks. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty grants countries the

right to reject individual inspectors.

Saddam sought veto rights over specific equipment brought to

the inspections. In negotiations currently underway in Vienna to

develop the inspection regime, countries are being given a veto over

equipment to be included on the approved list for inspections.

Saddam sought to declare certain sites as off-limits to inspections.

The so-called Presidential palaces with which you are familiar

were a little more than a safe haven for sensitive documents

that were being concealed from UNSCOM. The CTBT gives the inspected

party the right to ‘‘take measures to protect sensitive installations’’

and to declare 50 square kilometers as restricted access

sites. Inspectors under that treaty are not permitted to collect technical

signatures of a nuclear test in those areas.

In sum, Mr. Ambassador, for 8 years the United States—correctly,

I think—led the international community in rejecting Saddam

Hussein’s effort to hamstring UNSCOM by such tactics, only

for the present administration in Washington to turn around and

codify such measures in a global arms control treaty. So I just

wanted to make that as a record, about my feeling. If you have any

comment that you want to make, I welcome that, too, sir.

Very good. Well, let me say to you, sir, that you

have honored us by your presence here this morning. I cannot recall

another witness who was as succinct as you have been and as

responsive to questions. Thank you for coming. And if there be no

further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess.